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Disqualification for Bias and International 
Tribunals:  
Room for a Common Test? 
Margaret Allars* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article explores the scope for the development of a bias test apply-
ing to international tribunals.  In the absence of a developed test in any such 
tribunal, an obvious source of jurisprudence is the case-law on Article 6(1) of 
the European Convention, which the European Court of Human Rights ap-
plies to domestic tribunals of member states.  The requirement of impartiality 
in Article 6(1) has remained an abstract concept, slowly evolving on the 
foundation of common law maxims accepted as its rationale.  While United 
Kingdom courts claim that their recent renovation of the common law test of 
apparent bias is the result of the vertical effect of Article 6(1) jurisprudence, 
the influence appears to be in the reverse direction.  By contrast, the United 
States constitutional and statutory tests of bias United States make no claim 
to influence or be influenced by Article 6(1), yet draw upon the same common 
law maxims.  The ground shared by the bias tests under Article 6(1), in the 
United Kingdom and the United States, suggests the potential for develop-
ment of a global test.  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Independence and impartiality are desirable attributes of a judge.  Un-
surprisingly, the absence of these attributes in particular circumstances has 
been identified as a basis for disqualification of judges serving as members of 
international tribunals.  While judicial disqualification may seem a remote 
concern for an international tribunal, any judicial institution must have stan-
dards and procedures for the disqualification of judicial officers for bias.  The 
globalization of legal services, the use of ad hoc judges, and the increasing 
role of supranational institutions in resolving disputes suggest that the bias 
rule deserves to be on the agenda of an evolving global legal culture.  
A global bias rule might be expected to develop in the context of the 
norms governing disclosure of interests and disqualification of judges of in-
ternational tribunals with dispute resolution functions.1  Conventions and 
  
 * Professor, Faculty of Law, The University of Sydney; member of the New 
South Wales Bar. 
           1. See Shane Spelliscy, The Proliferation of International Tribunals: A Chink 
in the Armor, 40 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 143, 151 (2001). 
1
Allars: Allars: Disqualification for Bias
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: AllarsPaginated.docx Created on:  10/27/13 3:10 PM Last Printed: 12/10/13 7:52 PM 
380 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
rules of the International Court of Justice, the European Court of Human 
Rights (“ECHR”) and the World Trade Organization address such matters, 
but little is known of their practical operation.  Perhaps international judges 
are rarely the subjects of recusal applications, or anticipate and resolve such 
matters in advance of any hearing.  Because current conventions are not 
transparent, the content of a global bias rule must evolve in some other more 
publicly accessible crucible.  Because bias in a tribunal impairs the right to a 
fair trial, the construction and application of international human rights in-
struments provides a context for developing a bias test potentially applicable 
to international and domestic courts and tribunals.  The requirements of inde-
pendence and impartiality, which are central to the right to a fair trial, are 
embodied in Article 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Hu-
man Rights and Freedoms (“European Convention”).  The jurisprudence of 
the ECHR on Article 6 offers an obvious resource for the development of a 
bias test.2  That jurisprudence provides a standard to which a judge of the 
ECHR might resort if faced with a recusal application.  
This Article examines the evolution of the bias test in case law of the 
ECHR under Article 6(1), with a view to its evaluation against the backdrop 
of the domestic tests in the United Kingdom and the United States.  Part II 
gives context to the comparison by reviewing the legal concepts deployed in 
bias tests in common law and civil systems.  Part III examines the ECHR case 
law on the requirements of independence and impartiality under Article 6(1).  
Part IV is concerned with the common law test in the United Kingdom and, 
as might be expected of a member state, its responsiveness and influence in 
relation to the ECHR case law.  Careful analysis suggests a persistently ab-
stract assertion of principle in the ECHR and a complex dynamic in the de-
velopment of the common law in the United Kingdom.  Part V examines the 
test of bias in the United States.  At first glance an unsuitable comparison, 
being insulated from the developments in the ECHR, the United States offers 
a “control” in the experiment, indicating the potential for bias tests in dispa-
rate jurisdictions to be accommodated within a global test.  The hypothesis 
which emerges is that impartiality is the dominant concept in the ECHR and 
the United States, subsuming the concept of independence.  Impartiality owes 
much to the common law tests of actual bias and apparent bias, which have 
incubated the possibility of a global test of bias.    
II.  STANDARDS AND LEGAL CULTURES 
When international tribunals are required to apply norms and determine 
disputes which arise for resolution by domestic judicial institutions, the bor-
  
 2. Charles H. Koch, Jr., Envisioning a Global Legal Culture, 25 MICH. J. INT’L 
L. 1, 15-16 (2003). 
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rowing of norms and methodology is more readily identified and evaluated.3  
The late Professor Charles Koch argued that through a process of borrowing 
from the two presently dominant legal cultures, the common law and civil 
legal systems, the decision-making techniques of international tribunals will 
evolve towards a global legal culture.4  Interpretations of authoritative lan-
guage on the case-by-case method of the common law will be interspersed 
with the justification of decisions according to civil law methodology, by 
reference to judicial and theoretical opinion and the balancing of interests.  
Such processes are not easily traced in connection with bias rules.  As 
descriptors of desirable judicial attributes, the words “independence” and 
“impartiality” have obvious appeal, and are often used interchangeably.5  
However, as tests for identifying bias of decision-makers, independence and 
impartiality suffer from uncertainty as to their denotation and as to their rela-
tionship.  These are words more readily understood by analysis of their anto-
nyms: “dependence” and “partiality.”  Dependence involves an unacceptable 
relationship between the decision-maker and a party or its counsel in a pro-
ceeding.  Partiality involves the decision-maker having an attitude of mind 
that is predisposed or prejudiced in favor of, or against, a party.  
Partiality dominates as a standard in case-law tests of bias.  Partiality 
appears to include dependence, which is just one means by which partiality 
may be established.6  However, a lack of dependence may not be sufficient to 
answer a claim of bias, because a decision-maker may be partial notwith-
standing his or her independence from the parties and their counsel.  Con-
versely, not every form of dependence results in partiality.  While depend-
ence is not the touchstone of partiality, it may not follow that independence is 
a necessary additional standard in any bias test.  
Partiality has been understood as falling into two broad types.  Subjec-
tive bias as the ECHR terms it, or actual bias as it is known at common law,7 
is established on the basis of evidence as to the judge’s interests and motives.8  
Objective bias for the ECHR, or apparent bias at common law, occurs where 
there is a danger, a probability, a risk, a possibility, or an apprehension as to 
prejudice or lack of fairness in the judge.9  The content of the test of objective 
or apparent bias is contested, with substantial differences as to the evidentiary 
  
 3. Christine E. J. Schwöbel, Situating the Debate in a Global Constitutionalism, 
8 INT’L J. CONSTIT. L. 611 (2010); Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Comity of 
Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 191, 217-18 (2003). 
 4. Koch, Jr., supra note 2, at 2-6, 75-76. 
 5. Micallef v. Malta, 50 Eur. Ct. H.R. 37, 940 (2010). 
 6. Morris v. United Kingdom App. No. 38784/97, HUDOC, ¶ 58 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
2002), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
60170; Findlay v. United Kingdom App. No. 22107/93, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 221, 245 
(1997). 
 7. Davidson v. Scottish Ministers [2004] UKHL 34 at ¶ 6 – 7. 
 8. Kyprianou v. Cyprus, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. 27, 594 (2007). 
 9. See id. 
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thresholds that might be set.  Integral to the question as to the applicable 
threshold is the question of to whom the judge must appear to be biased.  
Specifically, should the bias be apparent to the very judge subject to the 
recusal application, or to judicial colleagues approaching the matter objec-
tively, or to an observer removed from the fray but not so well informed as 
the judge?  
These concepts and themes have been addressed in a variety of circum-
stances which fall into two broad categories.  The first concerns involvement 
by the judge in some incident or circumstance that could give rise to pre-
judgment, including where  an office holder in the position of prosecutor, or 
other person, communicates with the judge ex parte; the judge has had a role 
as complainant or prosecutor; or the judge has previously determined the 
same issues in relation to a party.10  The second category includes circum-
stances where the judge has an association, including as a prior legal repre-
sentative of a party in the proceedings; or the judge has a family or personal 
relationship with a party or legal representative.11  The circumstances in the 
first category tend to arise in civil systems simply by reason of institutional 
arrangements, but in extraordinary circumstances can arise in common law 
systems.  The circumstances in the second category are equally likely to arise 
in civil and common law systems.  
The meaning of independence and impartiality, central to the ECHR test 
of bias, becomes more concrete when those concepts are deployed in the cir-
cumstances of a particular case. Analysis of the ECHR case-law reveals, per-
haps unexpectedly, resort to  maxims drawn from the common law bias test. 
III.  ARTICLE 6(1) OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION AND 
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
A.  Rule Applying to the ECHR 
Article 21(3) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Freedoms (“European Convention”) provides that judges of the 
ECHR are not to “engage in any activity which is incompatible with their 
independence, impartiality or with the demands of a full-time office.”12  The 
  
 10. See, e.g., Harabin v. Slovakia, No. 58688/11, HUDOC, ¶ 108 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
2012) (Eur.), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
114666; R (on the application of Kaur) v. Institute of Legal Executives Appeal Tribu-
nal [2012] 1 All E.R. 1435 (United Kingdom). 
 11. See John P. Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 622-23 
(1947). 
 12. European Convention on Human Rights, art. 21(3) (2010). 
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ECHR itself is to decide all questions arising from the application of this 
paragraph.13  
The European Convention and the Rules of Court of the ECHR contain 
more specific prohibitions.  A judge is precluded from sitting alone or presid-
ing in a case in which one of the parties is the member state of which the 
judge is a national or from which the judge was elected,14 but may otherwise 
sit in such matters in the Chamber and in matters referred to the Grand 
Chamber15 as an ex officio member.16  Rule 28(2) spells out the bases on 
which a judge should recuse: a personal interest in the case, including a 
spousal, parental or other close family, personal, professional or subordinate 
relationship with any of the parties; previously having acted in the case; en-
gagement in any political, administrative  or  professional activity incompati-
ble with the judge’s independence or impartiality (a provision relevant to ad 
hoc judges); and previous public expression of opinions that are objectively 
capable of adversely affecting the judge’s impartiality.17  Finally, rule 
28(2)(e) is a catch-all provision, requiring recusal if “for any other reason, 
[the judge’s] independence or impartiality may legitimately be called into 
doubt.”18  
Applicable instruments and rules will differ between international tribu-
nals.  Some may render a judge automatically disqualified from hearing a 
case in which a party is the state of which the judge is a national,19 while oth-
ers permit the judge to sit but seek to balance the numbers.20 The position for 
  
 13. Rule 4(1) of the Rules of Court of the ECHR, 1 Sept. 2012, also provides that 
“the judges shall not during their term of office engage in any political or administra-
tive activity or any professional activity which is incompatible with their independ-
ence or impartiality or with the demands of a full-time office.”  EUR. CT. H.R. R. 4(1).   
 14. European Convention on Human Rights, art 26(3); EUR. CT. H.R. R. 13, 
24(5)(c). 
 15. Pursuant to Article 43 of the European Convention, the Grand Chamber may 
hear referrals of exceptional cases that raise serious questions  affecting the interpreta-
tion or application of the Convention or its Protocols or serious issues of general im-
portance.  
 16. European Convention on Human Rights, art 26(4);  EUR. CT. H.R. R. 
24(2)(b), 26(1)(a). 
 17. EUR. CT. H.R. R. 28(2). 
 18. Id. R. 28(2)(e). 
 19. For example, a panel of the World Trade Organization: Agreement Establish-
ing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2: Understanding on Rules and Procedures 
Governing the Settlement of Disputes, art 8(3). 
 20. For example, in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the President and 
Vice-President may not preside over proceedings if they are of the same nationality as 
a party, but all judges retain the right to sit where a party is of their own nationality.  
In a case where the ICJ does not include a judge of the nationality of a party, that 
party may choose an additional judge ad hoc (who may be of that party’s nationality) 
to sit in the case.   Statute of the International Court of Justice (annexed to the Charter 
of the United Nations) Article 31; ICJ Rules of Court Articles 1(2), 32, 35, 36, 37.  
5
Allars: Allars: Disqualification for Bias
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2013
File: AllarsPaginated.docx Created on:  10/27/13 3:10 PM Last Printed: 12/10/13 7:52 PM 
384 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 78 
the ECHR is an intermediate one, modestly limiting the nature of the judge’s 
participation. These tests may also raise questions as to the relationship be-
tween general requirements of impartiality and independence and particular 
bases for disqualification.  Thus, in the case of the ECHR, precisely identified 
bases for recusal are set out in the Rules of Court.  Moreover, Article 21(3) of 
the European Convention invokes independence and impartiality as the key 
standards applying to the ECHR.21  There are also the standards describing 
the right to a fair trial in Article 6(1) of the European Convention applying to 
the courts and tribunals of member states of the European Union.22  Interroga-
tion of the ECHR’s application of Article 6(a) is a natural point of departure 
for understanding the standards required of judges of the EHCR itself. 
B.  Article 6 of the European Convention 
Article 6(1) of the European Convention provides that “[i]n the determi-
nation of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against 
him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time 
by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.”23 
Decisions of the ECHR have chiefly concerned the impartiality limb of 
the test rather than the independence limb.  In the early decision of Delcourt 
v. Belgium, the ECHR, in determining the question of impartiality, cited with 
approval the maxim that it is “of a certain importance . . . that ‘justice must 
not only be done; it must also be seen to be done.”24  From this maxim, 
coined by Lord Hewart C.J. in R. v Sussex Justices ex p. McCarthy,25 the 
ECHR has derived two tests: subjective bias26 and objective bias.27 There is 
“no watertight division” between the subjective and objective tests, in the 
sense that both tests may be satisfied in one case.28  Subjective bias arises by 
reason of the “personal conviction of the given judge in a given case.”29  
  
 21. European Convention on Human Rights, art. 21(3) (2010). 
 22. Id. art. 6(1). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Delcourt v. Belgium, App. No. A/11, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 355, 369 (1970). 
 25. 1 K.B. 256, 259 (1923) (Eng.). 
 26. Micallef v. Malta, 50 Eur. Ct. H.R. 37, 944 (2010) (Eur.); Kingsley v. United 
Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. 10, 300 (2002); De Cubber v. Belgium, App. No. 9186/80, 7 
Eur. H.R. Rep. 236, 246 (1984); Piersack v. Belgium, App. No. A/53, 5 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 169, 179 (1982). 
 27. Micallef, 50 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 943; Kyprianou v. Cyprus, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. 27, 
594 (2007); Kingsley, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 300; Hauschildt v. Denmark, App. No. 
A/54, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 266, 279 (1990); De Cubber, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 244; Pier-
sack, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 179. 
 28. Kyprianou, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 595. 
 29. Piersack, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 179; see also Pohoska v. Poland, App. No. 
33530/06, HUDOC, ¶ 35 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2012) (Eur.), available at 
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However, the personal impartiality of the judge is presumed until there is 
proof to the contrary.30  
While continuing to approve Lord Hewart’s maxim,31 since 1982 the 
EHCR has identified the underlying rationale of the objective test as the 
maintenance of the confidence which the courts in a democratic society must 
inspire in the public and above all, as far as criminal proceedings are con-
cerned, in the accused.  Objective bias  turns upon appearances.  For example, 
the circumstances may involve the judge “offer[ing] guarantees sufficient to 
exclude any legitimate doubt in this respect”,32 or the impartiality of the do-
mestic court may be “capable of appearing to the applicant to be open to 
doubt”, or there may be “grounds for some legitimate misgivings on the ap-
plicant’s part”,33 or “a legitimate reason to fear a lack of impartiality in the 
judge.”34 
1.  Impartiality: Subjective Bias 
Subjective bias is infrequently established, with the presumption of im-
partiality usually not being rebutted.  Proof to the contrary may consist in  
evidence of the judge having displayed hostility or ill-will toward the appli-
cant, or having arranged for reasons extraneous to the normal rules governing 
the allocation of cases, to have the investigations assigned to him or her.35  
The mere fact that a judge has been involved in earlier proceedings concern-
ing the same parties will not in itself constitute sufficient evidence to rebut 
the presumption as to impartiality.36   
Subjective bias was established in Kyprianou v. Cyprus.37  The Limassol 
Assize Court in Cyprus committed a lawyer defending an accused for con-
tempt and sentenced him to  imprisonment for five days.38  The lawyer had 
objected to the court interrupting him while he was cross-examining a wit-
ness.39  When the judges refused his request for permission to withdraw from 
the case, he alleged that they had been talking to each other and sending each 
  
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-108418; Kingsley, 33 
Eur. Ct. H.R. at 300; Hauschildt, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 279.  
 30. De Cubber, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 243. 
 31. Id. at 244. 
 32. Piersack, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 179; Hauschildt, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 279; 
Kingsley, 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 301; Pohoska, No. 33530/06, HUDOC, ¶ 35. 
 33. De Cubber, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 246. 
 34. Hauschildt, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 279. 
 35. See, e.g., De Cubber, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 243. 
 36. Sorgic v. Serbia, App. No. 34973/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶¶ 67-68 (Nov. 3, 
2011). 
 37. Kyprianou v. Cyprus, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. 27 (2007). 
 38. Id. at 570-73. 
 39. Id. at 570-71. 
7
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other notes.40  The subjective test was infringed because the judges stated that 
the applicant had “deeply insulted” them “as persons,” which in itself indi-
cated their “personal embroilment.”41    
Evidence that a judge of the Elblag regional court in Poland felt person-
ally offended by the applicant and was contemplating bringing proceedings 
for criminal defamation against him, also established subjective bias in Le-
wandowski v Poland.42 The applicant had written to the judge, questioning his 
ability to make a sound decision. The judge summarily convicted him of con-
tempt of court and sentenced him to the maximum available penalty of soli-
tary confinement for twenty-eight days, immediately enforceable. The ECHR 
considered the subjective and objective tests together, observing that the per-
sonal convictions of a judge may also give rise to misgivings from the point 
of view of an external observer.43 The evidence of the judge’s feelings and 
motives met the subjective test. The confusion of the roles of complainant, 
prosecutor and judge raised objectively justified fears supported by the 
maxim that no person should be a judge in his or her own cause.44   
2.  Impartiality: Objective Bias 
The content of objective bias in the test of impartiality in Article 6(1), 
and the methodology for its application, is conveniently examined by analysis 
of cases falling into each of the two broad categories described above.  This 
analysis also allows for comparison of the objective test with the common 
law test of apparent bias. 
i.  Prejudgment 
As outlined above, prejudgment is the first broad category of circum-
stances where bias may be established. Initially the ECHR set a high thresh-
old for meeting the objective test. Gradually the outcomes in the case-law, if 
not the ECHR’s statements of principle, have indicated that the test has been 
relaxed, bringing it closer to the common law test of apparent bias.  
  
 40. Id. at 570-72. 
 41. Id. at 597.  The judges also used emphatic language, conveying “a sense of 
indignation and shock” inconsistent with “the detached approach expected” in a 
judgment.  Id.  Further, they regarded the sentence as “the only adequate response,”as  
“they considered [the applicant] guilty” so that he was in effect “asked to mitigate 
‘the damage he had caused by his behaviour’ rather than defend himself and pro-
ceeded instanter, with speed, and with only brief exchanges with the applicant.”  Id. 
 42. Mariusz Lewandowski v. Poland, No. 66484/09, HUDOC (Eur. Ct. H. R. 
2012) (Eur.) available at  http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites. 
 43. Id. at 47. 
 44. Id. at 48. 
8
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The leading ECHR authority on prejudgment is Delcourt v. Belgium.45  
In Delcourt, a person convicted of fraud complained of a procedure, by which 
the Procureur général46 participated in the private deliberations of the Bel-
gian Cour de Cassation in his appeal.47  The procedure had been in place in 
Belgium law for one and a half centuries.48  The ECHR robustly rejected a 
claim of violation of Article 6(1).49  Impartiality was not affected because 
there was no subjective bias and the independence of the Procureur général 
from the officers of the separate department that prosecuted Delcourt indi-
cated there was no objective bias.50  A “careful examination of the real posi-
tion and function of the Procureur général’s department attached to the Court 
of Cassation,”51 allowed the ECHR to conclude that “[l]ooking behind ap-
pearances, the Court does not find the realities of the situation to be in any 
way in conflict with this right [to justice being not only done but seen to be 
done].”52   
Had the common law test of apparent bias been applied, Delcourt would 
have succeeded, not only because the Cour de Cassation made its decision in 
the presence of a person in the position of complainant or prosecutor, but also 
because ex parte communications were made to the Cour de Cassation by a 
third party, with Delcourt having no opportunity to respond.53  Indeed a 
common lawyer would protest that the ECHR fell into legal error in applying 
its own objective test.  To rely upon the “realities of the situation”54 rather 
than appearances, is to apply a test of subjective bias not objective bias. 
Decisions subsequent to Delcourt indicate a trend towards evaluation of 
impartiality from a common law, and hence non-inquisitorial, perspective.55  
  
 45. 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 355 (1970). 
 46. In Belgium the Procureur général is the senior Crown prosecutor responsible 
for opening criminal investigations, with power to hold a suspect temporarily in cus-
tody and responsibility for stating the nature of the crime for the examining judge and 
recommending any further investigation.  The nature of the office and the department 
to which it is attached, in the trial and in an appeal is discussed in detail in Delcourt.  
Id. 
 47. Id. at 359-60. 
 48. Id. at 361. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 369-70.  The department of the Procureur at the Cour de Cassation 
was independent of the department of the Procureur, which was a party to the prose-
cution.  Id. at 369-71.  The Procureur général did not appear in the Cour de Cassa-
tion as a party or as an “adversary of the accused” but in order to assist the Court in 
the “observance of the law[]” rather than in establishing guilt or innocence.  Id. at 
370. 
 51. Id. at 368. 
 52. Id. at 369. 
 53. See id. at 360-61. 
 54. Id. at 369. 
 55. De Cubber v. Belgium, App. No. 9186/80, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 236 (1984); 
Kyprianou v. Cyprus, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. 27 (2007); Volkov v. Ukraine No. 21722/11 
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Such an approach more readily establishes objective bias.  An example is De 
Cubber v. Belgium56 in which the ECHR held that a breach of Article 6(1) 
occurred because one of the judges of the tribunal correctionnel that con-
victed the applicant had acted as investigating judge in three preliminary in-
vestigations in respect of the applicant, including the investigation relating to 
the present conviction.57  The combination of the trial judge’s function as 
investigating judge with “his presence on the bench provided grounds for 
some legitimate misgivings on the applicant’s part,”58 establishing objective 
bias.  The ECHR noted that the investigating judge, having already acquired, 
well before the hearing, a particularly detailed knowledge of the evidence, 
would be in a position to play a crucial role in the tribunal correctionnel and 
“even to have a pre-formed opinion which is liable to weigh heavily in the 
balance at the moment of the decision.”59  It was also relevant that one of the 
functions of the tribunal correctionnel was potentially to “review the lawful-
ness of [the] measures taken . . . by [an] investigating judge.”60  The ECHR 
stated its findings and conclusion as to violation of Article 6(1) without iden-
tifying a principle that informs the objective bias test.61 
In circumstances such as those in De Cubber, the common law test of 
apparent bias would also have been violated for reasons connected with two 
precise principles associated with that test.  The first is that a person in the 
  
HUDOC, ¶ 106, 114-117 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2013) (Eur.), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-115871; Perus v. Slove-
nia, No. 35016/05 HUDOC, ¶ 36-40 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 20) (Eur.), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-113520; Fatullayev v. 
Azerbaijan, No. 4098401/07 HUDOC, ¶ 137-140 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2010) (Eur.), avail-
able at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-98401. 
 56. 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 236. 
 57. Id. at 242-43, 250.  The role of an investigating judge was to “conduct the 
preparatory judicial investigation,” “assemb[ling] the evidence and . . . establish[ing] 
any proof against the accused as well as any circumstances that may tell in his favour, 
so as to provide the [trial court] . . . with the material which it needs to decide whether 
the accused should be committed for trial.”  Id. at 239.  These preparatory investiga-
tions were inquisitorial, conducted in secret in the absence of the parties or their legal 
representatives and “under the supervision of the procureur général.”  Id.  The inves-
tigating judge had “wide powers” to “summon the accused to appear [and be ques-
tioned], . . . issue a warrant for his detention, . . . hear witnesses, . . . visit [the scene of 
the crime] . . . and search premises.”  Id. at 240.  However, the investigating judge did 
not make the committal decision.  See id. at 240-41.  That decision was made by a 
single judge of the chambre du conseil which heard the investigating judge’s report, 
which did not contain an opinion as to the accused’s guilt.  Id. 
 58. Id. at 246. 
 59. Id. at 245-46.  An investigating judge may have ordered the accused to be 
placed in detention on remand and may have interrogated him.  Id. at 240. 
 60. Id. at 245-46.  Investigating judges were precluded from participating in 
proceedings before an assize court or as an appeal court judge.  Id. at 246. 
 61. See id. at 250. 
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position of accuser should not also act as judge, even by being present on the 
bench when the decision is made.62  This principle is one manifestation of the 
common law maxim nemo judex in sua causa: that no person shall be a judge 
in his or her own cause.63  An investigating judge who assembles the evi-
dence is in the position of accuser.  The second principle is that a judge who 
has previously determined the same factual issues has a closed mind and this 
prejudgment gives rise to apparent bias.  Given the ECHR’s factual findings, 
both principles support the conclusion reached  in De Cubber, but were not 
expressly invoked. 
While those common law principles are not explicit in De Cubber, the 
case may reflect an increased receptivity, fifteen years after Delcourt, to 
common law approaches to the bias rule.  It is true that a significant factual 
difference between the cases is that in De Cubber, the trial judge had partici-
pated in the investigatory process,64 while in Delcourt, an appellate judge 
received assistance in private deliberations from an official of a prosecutorial 
department which was found to be distinct from the actual prosecutor.65  
However, a common lawyer would be impatient with the claimed distinction 
in Delcourt between prosecutorial departments.  Ex parte communications 
about the case with the judge by any person, especially by a person formally 
in the position of a party, gives rise to apparent bias.  
Since De Cubber, the ECHR has regularly held that objective bias is 
generated in circumstances where a trial judge has made pre-trial decisions 
involving conclusions on factual issues that arise for decision at trial.66  In 
some cases, the ECHR’s findings as to an inappropriate combination of func-
tions, or prejudgment, have turned upon fine distinctions as to the nature of 
the determination to be made at each stage.67  Objective bias has also been 
  
 62. Allinson v. General Council of Medical Education and Registration [1894] 1 
Q.B. 747 at 758 (Eng). 
 63. R v. Gough [1993] A.C. 646 at 661; Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 2) [2000] 
1 A.C. 119 at 132-3. 
 64. De Cubber, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 239. 
 65. Delcourt v. Belgium, App. No. 2689/65, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 355, 359-60, 368-
71 (1970) (Eur.). 
 66. See Hauschildt v. Denmark, App. No. 10486/83, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 266, 278-
80 (1990) (holding where that Article 6(1) was violated because the judge who pre-
sided, sitting with two lay judges, at a trial for fraud and embezzlement, had also 
made pre-trial decisions, including decisions that the accused remain in detention on 
remand in solitary confinement until his trial, and that a request be made for the coop-
eration of other countries in securing documents). 
 67. Id. at 280 (finding that the making of pre-trial decisions would not have been 
enough on its own to give reason to fear a lack of impartiality).  In making the rele-
vant pre-trial decisions the judge summarily assessed the available evidence in order 
to ascertain whether the police had prima facie grounds for their suspicion that deten-
tion was required, whilst in giving judgment at the conclusion of the trial the judge 
was to assess whether the evidence sufficed for a guilty verdict.  Id.  These functions 
were different.  See id.  However, in this case Article 6(1) was violated.  Id. at 281.  
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established where the judge has made the findings in associated proceedings 
between the same parties and raising the same issues.68  This approach ap-
plies equally to tribunals as to courts.69 
The decline of Delcourt was most obvious when  the role of the Pro-
cureur général in the Belgian Cour de Cassation came under scrutiny again 
in 1993.70  The circumstances in Borgers v. Belgium were very similar to 
those in Delcourt, save that there was evidence in this case that in the private 
deliberations with the Court the Procureur général advocated that the appli-
cant’s appeal be dismissed.71  The ECHR stated that the conclusion in Del-
court remained entirely valid, but it was necessary in the present case also to 
consider “the rights of the defence and the principle of the equality of arms, 
which are features of the wider concept of a fair trial.”72  This consideration 
produced a lack of “neutral[ity] from the point of view of the parties to the 
[appeal].”73  Linking these concerns as to inequality in the hearing, with the 
somewhat diffuse concepts of “appearances and . . . the increased sensitivity 
of the public to the fair administration of justice,” the ECHR was, despite 
Delcourt, able to reach a conclusion that Article 6(1) was violated.74  The 
jurisprudence of the ECHR had evolved, with more importance now being 
given to appearances, although the ECHR shrank from designating the viola-
tion of Article 6(1) as a breach of the objective bias test.  
While the result in Delcourt is diminished for practical purposes by 
Borgers, it remains the primary authority on the content and rationale of the 
subjective and objective tests of impartiality.  However, it was not until 2007, 
in Kyprianou v. Cyprus75 that in such cases the ECHR called upon the com-
mon law maxim that that “no one should be a judge in his or her own 
cause.”76 In addition to its conclusion that the subjective test was met, as dis-
  
The critical factor was that in making several of the remand decisions, the judge relied 
specifically on a provision of the relevant code which required him to “be satisfied 
that there [was] a ‘particularly confirmed suspicion’ that the accused [had] committed 
the crime[] with which he [was] charged,” a test which required him to be convinced 
there was a very high degree of clarity as to the question of guilt.  Id.  The difference 
between determining this question and determining guilt at the trial was so tenuous 
that the judge’s impartiality at the trial was “capable of appearing to be open to 
doubt.”  Id. 
 68. See Sorgic v. Serbia, Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶¶ 70-71 (Nov. 3, 2011). 
 69. See Kingsley v. United Kingdom, 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 10, 188 (2002) (where a 
panel of the Gaming Board for Great Britain was infected by objective bias, violating 
Article 6(1) because it had already made preliminary findings on the very issue aris-
ing before it for determination). 
 70. Borgers v. Belgium, App. No. 12005/86, 15 Eur. H.R. Rep. 92 (1993). 
 71. Id. at 95, 99-100. 
 72. Id. at 107-08. 
 73. Id. at 108. 
 74. Id. at 108-09. 
 75. 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. 27 (2007). 
 76. Id. at 596-97. 
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cussed above, the ECHR held that the objective test was met because the 
confusion of roles between complainant, witness, prosecutor, and judge could 
prompt objectively justified fears of prejudgment.77  
3.  Associations 
The second category of cases where objective bias is established is con-
cerned with associations of the judge with other persons.  Such circumstances 
evoke concerns as to lack of independence.  Nonetheless, associations have 
been held to give rise to a lack of impartiality, by application of the objective 
bias test.  
In the colorful case of Micallef v. Malta, a dispute between neighbors 
about the hanging of washing over a courtyard came before the Court of Ap-
peal of Malta.78  The presiding member, who was the President of the Court 
and the Chief Justice, was the uncle of the advocate for the complainant 
neighbor, and the brother of the advocate who appeared for the neighbor at 
the first instance hearing.79  By majority vote, the ECHR held that “the close 
family ties between the [complainant’s] advocate and the Chief Justice . . . 
objectively justif[ied] [the] fear[] that the [Chief Justice] lacked impartial-
ity.”80  This case was an extreme example, but the ECHR case law does not 
suggest outcomes different from those that would be arrived at by application 
of the common law test of apparent bias to similar circumstances involving 
associations.  
4.  External Observer 
The methodology for testing objective bias has also evolved.  Early de-
cisions left unsaid who was required to hold the misgivings about the judge’s 
objectivity.  In De Cubber, the ECHR held that the misgivings or concerns 
  
 77. Id. at 596 (“The same judges then took the decision to prosecute, tried the 
issues arising from the applicant’s conduct, determined his guilt and imposed the 
sanction . . . .”).  In Kyprianou, as at common law, a court has jurisdiction to punish 
contempt by way of summary trial conducted by the judge who was presiding in pro-
ceedings in which the contempt occurred.  See id.  Nonetheless this case involved a 
functional defect which meant the applicant’s fears were “objectively justified” and 
objective bias was established.  Id. at 597. 
 78. 50 Eur. Ct. H.R. 37, 926 (2010). 
 79. Id. at 927. 
 80. Id. at 944, 946-47 (six of the eleven judges dissenting not as to the test under 
Article 6(1) but as to its application).  For more on objective bias arising from hierar-
chical or other links with actors in the legal proceedings, see Grieves v. United King-
dom, 39 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2 (2004), cited with approval in Kyprianou, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 
595; Piersack v. Belgium, App. A/53, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 169 (1983); see also Pohoska 
v. Poland, App. No. 33530/06, HUDOC, ¶ 16 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2012) (Eur.), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-108418. 
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were to be held by the applicant claiming violation of Article 6(1).81  How-
ever this approach has evolved towards an external observer test. 
A subtle shift occurred in Hauschildt, where the ECHR described the 
standpoint of the accused as important but not decisive, because the test was 
whether his fear of lack of impartiality was objectively justified.82  However, 
Hauschildt did not, in terms, embrace a fair-minded observer test and is con-
sistent with acceptance of the judge as the person with the appropriate per-
spective to undertake the objective assessment.83  As the common law test 
developed in the United Kingdom, Hauschildt was seized upon as authority 
that the ECHR had adopted the fair-minded observer test.  Yet, it was not 
until 2007, in Kyprianou v. Cyprus, that the ECHR referred to the objective 
test as determined “from the point of view of the external observer.”84  Since 
then the objective test has incorporated with growing frequency the concept 
of the external or objective observer.85 
C.  Independence 
“The [tests] of independence and . . . impartiality [in Article 6(1)] are 
closely linked,” as the ECHR observed in Findlay v. United Kingdom.86  Del-
court illustrates this connection in that the ECHR rejected a claim of lack of 
independence of the Cour de Cassation, for the same reasons that it rejected 
objective bias.87  Because the Procureur général was independent of the 
prosecuting authority, the Cour de Cassation was independent.88  However, 
the ECHR’s reasons mention considerations that are specific to independ-
ence: “the manner of appointment of [a tribunal’s members] and their term of 
  
 81. De Cubber v. Belgium, App. No. 9186/80, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 236, 246 (1984). 
 82. Hauschildt v. Denmark, App. No. 10486/83, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 266, 279 
(1990). 
 83. Id. at 286. 
 84. Kyprianou, 44 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 595. 
 85. Khordovsky & Lebedev v. Russia, No. 11082/06, 13772/05  HUDOC, ¶ 542 
(Eur. Ct. H.R. 2013) (Eur.), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages 
/search.aspx?i=001-122697; Rudnichenko v. Ukraine, No. 2775/07 HUDOC, ¶ 114 
(Eur. Ct. H.R. 2013) (Eur.), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages 
/search.aspx?i=001-122187; Volkov v. Ukraine, No. 21722/11 HUDOC, ¶ 105, 114-
117 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2013) (Eur.), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages 
/search.aspx?i=001-115871; Harabin v. Slovakia, No. 58688/11, HUDOC, ¶ 107 -109 
(Eur. Ct. H.R. 2012) (Eur.), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages 
/search.aspx?i=001-114666; Toziczka v. Poland, No. 29995/08 HUDOC, ¶ 34 (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 2012) (Eur.), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages 
/search.aspx?i=001-112444; Micallef v. Malta, 50 Eur. Ct. H.R. 37, 940 (2010); Olujk 
v. Croatia, No. 22330/05 HUDOC, ¶ 105 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2009) (Eur.), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages /search.aspx?i=001-91144. 
 86. App. No. 22107/93, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 221, 245 (1997).  
 87. Delcourt v. Belgium, App. No. A/11, 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 355, 369 (1970). 
 88. Id. 
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office, the existence of guarantees against outside pressures and . . . whether 
the [tribunal] presents an appearance of independence,” and whether it has 
power to give a binding decision which cannot be altered by a non-judicial 
authority.89 
In Findlay, the ECHR held that a court-martial in the United Kingdom 
was not independent.90  Its decision was not effective until “confirmed” by its 
convening officer, who had power to vary the sentence imposed as he saw fit, 
controlled the proceedings generally, and was superior in rank or even in a 
commanding position in relation to the members of the court martial.91   
Since Findlay, it has been established that it is possible for a military 
tribunal to be independent if it demonstrates a proper separation of prosecut-
ing, convening and adjudicating roles.92 Subsequent cases concerning other 
kinds of tribunals illustrate that a failure to meet an adequate standard with 
regard to any one of the variables, such as constitution, or freedom from ex-
ternal pressure, may result in a lack of independence.93  
By contrast to the position under Article 6(1), common law bias does 
not include a discrete test of lack of independence.94 The absence of such a 
test is consistent with the common law “doctrine of necessity”, which accepts 
that it may be the legislative intention that the decision-maker proceed to 
exercise power with apparent bias. According to the doctrine of necessity a 
statutory scheme may provide for an authority to exercise combined functions 
which give rise to apparent bias.  It is the legislative intention that the author-
ity perform all its functions in relation to a particular individual, properly 
constituted with the required quorum, notwithstanding that there are insuffi-
cient members available who are free from apparent bias arising from the 
  
 89. Findlay, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 244-46.   
 90. Findlay, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 236-37. 
 91. Id. at 245-46.  A “convening officer . . . played a [central] role . . . [in] de-
cid[ing] [on the] charge[] [to be] brought . . . and [the] type of court-martial . . . con-
ven[ing] the court-martial and appoint[ing] its members and the prosecuting and de-
fending officers . . . sending an abstract of the evidence to the prosecuting officer . . . 
procur[ing] the attendance at trial of the witnesses for the prosecution and those ‘rea-
sonably requested’ by the defence” and was vested with “power . . . to dissolve the 
court-martial.”  Id. at 245; see also Morris v. United Kingdom, App. No. 38784/97, 
HUDOC, ¶ 58-79 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2002), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-60170. 
 92. Cooper v. United Kingdom, App. No. 48843/99, HUDOC, ¶ 108-115 (Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 2003), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages 
/search.aspx?i=001-61549. 
 93. Schlachthof GMBH v. Austria, App. No. 21565/07, 21572/07, 21575/07, 
HUDOC, ¶ 28-34 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2013), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng 
/pages/search.aspx?i=001-118045; Pohoska v. Poland, App. No. 33530/06, HUDOC, 
¶ 34 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2012), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages 
/search.aspx?i=001-108418 
 94. See infra Part IV.A. 
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tribunal’s previous consideration of the issues.  Parliamentary sovereignty 
trumps the common law and the apparent bias is tolerated. 
The operation of the doctrine of necessity is illustrated by the circum-
stances that arose in Kingsley v. United Kingdom.95  A panel of the Gaming 
Board for Great Britain determined that Kingsley was not a “fit and proper 
person” to hold a certificate of approval to hold a management position in the 
gaming industry.96  All the members of the panel had participated in a board 
meeting, which had earlier resolved “that it had sufficient evidence . . . to 
conclude that [Kingsley] . . . was not a fit and proper person to be a director 
of a casino company.”97  The board, which was in the position of accuser, had 
refused Kingsley’s request that an independent tribunal hear his case.98  Pur-
suant to the “real danger” test, which was then applicable in the United King-
dom,99 there was no apparent bias, but even if there had been, the doctrine of 
necessity required that the panel proceed to perform its functions.100  How-
ever, the ECHR took a different view of the matter. The panel was infected 
by objective bias, and because of the doctrine of necessity the United King-
dom court which reviewed the panel’s decision did not have “full jurisdic-
tion” to grant relief in the form of an order remitting the matter to be decided 
by an impartial tribunal.  A breach of Article 6(1) had occurred.101 While not 
spelt out in the reasons of the Grand Chamber, the key to its conclusion was 
the panel’s lack of independence.  
D.  Conclusions 
Impartiality and independence have remained abstract concepts in 
ECHR jurisprudence on Article 6(1).  ECHR decisions contain uncomplicated 
re-statements of the subjective and objective bias tests, traverse the evidence, 
and announce conclusions.102  However, in adopting the objective bias test, 
the ECHR did accept Lord Hewart’s maxim, which tends to conjure up a 
body of common law.103  The second maxim, that no person can be a judge in 
his or her own cause, reinforces and explains much of that common law.104  
  
 95. 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. 10, 180-85 (2002). 
 96. Id. at 182. 
 97. Id.  The resolution was recorded in the minutes of the board.  Id.  In addition, 
in a speech to the British Casino Association the board’s chairperson stated that the 
board and the police were satisfied that “unacceptable [practices of the company] had 
ceased, [and] that persons [the Board and the police] regarded . . . as not fit and proper 
had been removed” from the company.  Id. at 181. 
 98. Id at ¶ 17. 
 99. See infra Parts IV.A, B. 
 100. Id. at 184-85. 
 101. Id. at 188, 191. 
 102. See supra Parts III.B.1-2. 
 103. Supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 104. Supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
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This maxim carries adversarial features that can only awkwardly co-exist 
with civil law procedure.  The rationale for objective bias under Article 6(1) 
is borrowed from its common law counterpart – apparent bias.105  This ration-
ale accounts for the practical demise of Delcourt and the slow evolution in 
the application of the objective test to adoption of the common law’s fair-
minded observer. On the other hand the independence test in Art 6(1) has no 
counterpart in the common law test of bias. The operation of the common law 
doctrine of necessity illustrates that it may be the legislative intention that a 
tribunal to some degree is to lack independence.   
   
IV.  BIAS RULE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM 
A.  Historical Context of Apparent Bias Test 
At common law bias has not been based upon a concept of independ-
ence.  Nor has the word impartiality featured in the bias rule.  If there was 
evidence of actual bias, the judge was disqualified.106 However, cases of ac-
tual bias were rare.  Most cases were concerned with apparent bias.  Prior to 
1993, the test in the United Kingdom of apparent bias was unsettled.  One 
line of authority favored a test of “real danger or likelihood of bias,” while 
the other favored a test with a lower threshold of “reasonable suspicion or 
apprehension of bias.”107  The question was resolved in R. v. Gough in favor 
of a test that examined whether there is in the view of the court “a real dan-
ger” that the judge was biased.108  The formula “real danger” was preferred to 
“real likelihood” because the former spoke “in terms of possibility rather than 
probability of bias.”109  Thus, the Gough test was envisaged to be a test of 
possibility with a lower threshold than probability.110  Lord Goff of Chieveley 
held that it was not necessary to require that the court look at the matter 
though the eyes of a reasonable person or fair-minded observer, because the 
court in such cases personifies the reasonable person.111 
  
 105. See supra Part III.B.2. 
 106. See  Davidson v. Scottish Ministers [2004] UKHL 34 at ¶ 6 – 7. 
 107. See Locabail (U.K.) Ltd. v. Bayfield Props. Ltd., [2000] Q.B. 451 at 475 
(Eng.). 
 108. [1993] A.C. 646, 670 (Eng.). 
 109. Id.. 
 110. See id.  
 111. Id.  Thus, in R. v. HM Coroner for Inner London West Dist. ex parte Dalla-
glio, the English Court of Appeal held, applying the test in Gough, that remarks made 
by a coroner when refusing to continue an inquest, including that a relative of a disas-
ter victim was “unhinged,” gave rise to a real possibility he had unconsciously al-
lowed his decision to be influenced by hostility towards the applicant and other mem-
bers of an action group.  [1994] 4 All E.R. 139 (Eng.). 
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Sitting alongside the real danger test was a well-established “pecuniary 
interest” rule, requiring automatic disqualification where a judge was party to 
the litigation or had a financial or property interest in its outcome.112  In such 
cases there was no need to apply the real danger test because the judge was 
automatically disqualified.  
In R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pino-
chet Ugarte (No. 2), the House of Lords relaxed the automatic disqualifica-
tion rule a little, by accepting that a judge is not automatically disqualified by 
reason of having a de minimis pecuniary interest.113  However, at the same 
time, the House of Lords extended the automatic disqualification rule to some 
non-pecuniary interests, namely those where the judge “is concerned with the 
promotion of the cause” of one of the parties.114  In this case the judge in 
question, Lord Hoffmann, was a director and chairman of an unincorporated 
association established as a charity to raise funds for Amnesty International 
(“AI”).115  AI had intervened in proceedings for judicial review of warrants 
for the extradition of Senator Pinochet to Chile to be tried for crimes against 
humanity.116  Lord Hoffmann was not a party, nor was his interest pecuniary, 
but as a director of a charity closely allied to, and acting with, a party to the 
litigation, he was automatically disqualified.117 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson noted in In re Pinochet (No 2) that courts in 
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand had expressed criticism of the real dan-
ger test in Gough, rejecting or modifying it.118  In preferring a “reasonable 
apprehension” test, Deane J in the High Court of Australia had described the 
real danger test, applied by the trial judge rather than a fair-minded observer, 
as tantamount to a test of actual bias modified by a standard of proof of real 
possibility.119  Despite noting such criticism, Lord Browne-Wilkinson held 
that it was not necessary to review the test in Gough.120 
In In re Pinochet (No. 2), Lord Browne-Wilkinson explained the ration-
ale for the automatic disqualification rule as the maxim that no person shall 
be a judge in his or her own cause.121  The maxim continued to support the 
automatic disqualification rule with its extension to some non-pecuniary in-
  
 112. Dimes v. Proprietors of the Grand Junction Canal, 10 E. R. 301 at 306 (1852) 
(Eng.). 
 113. (2000) 1 A.C. 119, 144 (H.L., Lord Hutton) (Eng.) [hereinafter In re Pino-
chet (No. 2)] (citing Dimes, 10 E. R. at 311). 
 114. Id. at 135 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson), 138-39 (Lord Goff of Chieveley), 145 
(Lord Hutton). 
 115. Id. at 129-30. 
 116. Id. at 125-26. 
 117. Id. at 133. 
 118. Id. at 136. 
 119. Webb v. The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41 at 71 (Austl.) (expressly rejecting 
the real danger test in Gough). 
 120. In re Pinochet (No. 2), (2000) 1 A.C. (H.L.) at 136. 
 121. Id. at 132. 
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terests.122  That maxim is not the rationale for apparent bias, where someone 
other than the judge normally benefits.123  According to Lord Hope of Craig-
head, the rationale of apparent bias is Lord Hewart’s maxim that “justice 
must not only be done . . . . [but] be seen to be done.”124  This maxim is con-
cerned with preserving “[p]ublic confidence in the integrity of the administra-
tion of justice . . . .”125  
Thus, by 2000, the test of apparent bias in the United Kingdom was for 
most practical purposes aligned with the test of objective bias in Article 6(1) 
as understood by the ECHR.  Apparent bias at common law and objective 
bias under Article 6(1) were about appearances.  Delcourt and In re Pinochet 
(No. 2) demonstrate that both tests are explained by the maxim that justice 
must not only be done but be seen to be done.  Lord Hewart’s maxim was 
ultimately concerned with preservation of public confidence in the admini-
stration of justice.  Neither the ECHR nor United Kingdom courts had yet 
accepted the standpoint of the fair-minded observer.  One difference was that 
the jurisprudence of the ECHR contained no notion of automatic disqualifica-
tion, let alone automatic disqualification on account of the judge holding non-
pecuniary interests. 
B.  Adoption of the Fair-Minded Observer and Demise of the Real 
Danger Test 
After October 2, 2000, English courts were obliged under the Human 
Rights Act 1998 (UK) to give effect to the right to a fair trial in Article 6 of 
the European Convention, which was set out in Schedule 1 to the Act.126  
Locabail (U.K.) Ltd. v. Bayfield Properties Ltd. was the first appellate case to 
raise Article 6 for consideration.127  The English Court of Appeal expressed 
the opinion that the reasonable apprehension test applied in some other com-
mon law countries “may be more closely in harmony with the jurisprudence 
of the [ECHR]” than is the “real danger” test, but declined to engage in 
analysis as to whether application of each test would give the same outcome 
in all cases.128 
Rejecting a submission that a fair-minded observer test should be 
adopted, the Court observed in Locabail that a judge personifying the reason-
  
 122. Id. at 135.  Lord Hutton, however, appeared to regard the extension of the 
automatic disqualification rule to non-pecuniary interests as supported by the need to 
protect public confidence in the administration of justice.  Id. at 145 (Lord Hutton). 
 123. Id. at 132-33. 
 124. Id. at 141 (Lord Hope of Craighead). 
 125. Id.  Lord Hope referred to Article 6 of the European Convention, but only to 
make the point that the apparent bias rule applies to criminal as well as civil proceed-
ings.  Id. 
 126. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, sch. 1 (U.K.). 
 127. [2000] Q.B. 451 (Eng.). 
 128. Id. at 476-77. 
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able person applies the real danger test with common sense, without relying 
upon special knowledge, in particular without knowledge of the minutiae of 
court procedure or other matters outside the ken of an ordinary reasonable, 
well-informed member of the public.129  This description of the judge per-
sonifying the reasonable man came perilously close to a description of a fair-
minded observer, suggesting that the Court’s rejection of that standpoint was 
a rejection in name only.130   
The replacement of the judge personifying the reasonable person with 
the “fair-minded observer” followed one year later, in In re Medicaments & 
Related Classes of Goods (No. 2).131  The English Court of Appeal held that 
there was a real danger of bias when an economic expert who was a member 
of the Restrictive Trade Practices Court applied for a position with an eco-
nomic consultancy firm whose director was a principal expert witness in a 
proceeding before her.  The Court made what it described as “a modest ad-
justment” to the Gough test:132  
When the Strasbourg jurisprudence is taken into account, we be-
lieve that a modest adjustment of the test in R. v. Gough is called 
for, which makes it plain that it is, in effect, no different from the 
test applied in most of the Commonwealth and in Scotland.  The 
court must first ascertain all the circumstances which have a bear-
ing on the suggestion that the judge was biased.  It must then ask 
whether those circumstances would lead a fair-minded and in-
formed observer to conclude that there was a real possibility, or a 
real danger, the two being the same, that the tribunal was biased.133 
The acceptance of the fair-minded observer was formally attributed to 
the Court having taken into account ECHR jurisprudence.134  The claimed 
conformity with the common law of other Commonwealth countries was 
consequential.  However, the Court had quoted at length from Australian 
authority criticizing the preference in Gough for judicial perceptions over 
perceptions of the public and highlighting the advantage of the fair-minded 
observer test in avoiding a slur upon the judge.135   
While the In re Medicaments court was confident that this adjustment 
rendered the English test “no different” from the tests in Scotland and most of 
the Commonwealth, it was less forthright as to consistency with the ECHR 
test.136  While the adjusted test was described as “close” to the ECHR test, it 
  
 129. Id. at 477. 
 130. See id. 
 131. (2001) 1 W.L.R. 700  (Eng.) [hereinafter In re Medicaments]. 
 132. Id. at 726-27. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See id. at 711, 726. 
 135. Id. at 722 (citing Webb v The Queen (1994) 181 CLR 41 at 71-72 (Austl.)). 
 136. Id. at 726-27. 
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was not claimed to be identical.137  This hesitancy may have stemmed from a 
view that the retention of the real danger and real possibility component of 
the apparent bias test was not consistent with the approach taken by the 
ECHR to objective bias.  The Court had noted that unlike Gough, Delcourt 
did not adopt a real danger test.138  
Subsequently, in Porter v. Magill, the House of Lords, for the first time, 
reasoned in the language of independence and impartiality.139  The modest 
adjustment made in In re Medicaments was approved, but a further change 
was made – the abandonment of the real danger formula.140  In the leading 
speech on the issue, Lord Hope of Craighead held that the “words no longer 
serve[d] a useful purpose . . . . not [being] used in the [ECHR jurisprudence], 
and the test was now “whether the fair-minded and informed observer, having 
considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility that the 
tribunal was biased.”141   
Lord Hope did not abandon the formula of “real possibility.”142  In 
Gough and later cases, “real possibility” had been said to be the same as the 
“real danger” formula.143  However, as a matter of ordinary language, the 
words “real danger” seem to set a higher threshold than the words “real pos-
sibility.”  If there were no difference, there would be no point in abandoning 
the “real danger” formula.  Effectively, despite the previous assertions that 
the words are synonymous, by removing “real danger,” Porter v. Magill low-
ered the threshold for establishing apparent bias.144  
In reaching this conclusion, Lord Hope paid close attention to Article 
6(1), approving the statement by the ECHR in Findlay v. United Kingdom as 
to the meaning of the concepts of independence and impartiality.145  In aban-
doning the “real danger” formula, Lord Hope sought to improve compatibility 
of the Gough test with the requirement of the European Convention test, as it 
had been explained in Piersack,146 De Cubber,147 Pullar v. United King-
dom,148 and Hauschildt,149 that “a fear that the judge lacks impartiality . . . 
  
 137. See id. at 726. 
 138. Id. at 723. 
 139. (2002) 2 A.C. 357 at 488-91 ((H.L., Eng.). 
 140. Id. at 494. 
 141. Id. 
 142. See id. 
 143. Id. (referring to Gough, [1993] A.C. 646 at 670 (Eng.), Ex parte Pinochet 
(No 2), [2000] 1 AC 119 at 136, 142; Locabail (UK) Ltd v. Bayfield Properties Ltd, 
[2000] QB 451 at 477). 
 144. Porter, (2002) 2 A.C. at 494 (H.L., Eng). 
 145. Id. at 488-89. 
 146. Piersack v. Belgium, App. No. A/53, 5 Eur. H.R. Rep. 169, 179-80 (1982) 
(Eur.). 
 147. De Cubber v. Belgium, App. No. 9186/80, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 236, 246 (1984) 
(Eur.). 
 148. App. No. 22399/93, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 391, 402-03 (1996) (Eur.). 
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can be . . . ‘objectively justified.’”150  While in In re Pinochet (No. 2), the 
House of Lords had declined to review disconformity of its own test with that 
applied in Scotland, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, it was time to ap-
prove the modest adjustment made by the Court of Appeal in In re Medica-
ments.151  The new test was “in harmony with the objective test which the 
Strasbourg court applies when it is considering whether the circumstances 
give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.”152  However, Lord Hope went 
further.  He explained that the reason why the words “real danger” should be 
removed from the test was that such words “are not used in the jurisprudence 
of the Strasbourg court” and “no longer serve[d] a useful purpose.”153  
Curiously, the requirements that the House of Lords discerned in the ju-
risprudence of the ECHR are not readily identified.  When Porter v. Magill 
was decided, the existing ECHR authority was that fear of lack of impartiality 
on the part of the applicant alone was insufficient because that fear must be 
objectively justified.154  The ECHR had not taken a position on the competing 
versions of the appropriate standpoint for applying the test: the judge personi-
fying the reasonable man, or the fair-minded observer.155  The ECHR itself 
simply applied the “objectively justified” test to each case on the evidence 
before it, without speculating as to the level of knowledge that might be held 
by an external observer.   
Following Porter v. Magill, Lord Steyn observed that “there is now no 
difference between the common law test of bias and the requirements under 
Article 6 of the [European] Convention of an independent and impartial tri-
bunal.”156  In R. v. Abdroikov, Baroness Hale of Richmond described the 
United Kingdom test of apparent bias as now being the same as objective bias 
in European Convention jurisprudence.157   
The renovation of the common law bias rule in the United Kingdom 
faced one remaining challenge: the problem created by In re Pinochet (No. 2).  
The Privy Council decision Meerabux v. Attorney-General of Belize turned 
upon whether a member of a disciplinary tribunal was automatically disquali-
fied by reason of his membership of the Bar Association of Belize.158  In 
  
 149. Hauschildt v. Denmark, App. No. 10486/83, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 266, 279 
(1990) (Eur.). 
 150. Porter, (2002) 2 A.C. at 493 (quoting Hauschildt, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 279). 
 151. Id. at 494. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 493. 
 155. See supra Part III.B.4. 
 156. Lawal v. N. Spirit Ltd., [2003] I.C.R.856 862 (H.L., U.K.). 
 157. [2007] 1 W.L.R. 2679 at 2688 (U.K.) (citing Hauschildt v. Denmark, App. 
No. 10486/83, 12 Eur. H.R. Rep. 266, 279 (1990) (Eur.)). 
 158. [2005] 2 A.C. 513 at 526 (U.K.). 
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making this decision, the Privy Council made no mention of apparent bias.159  
However, Lord Hope observed that if the House of Lords in In re Pinochet 
(No. 2) had applied a real possibility test rather than a real danger test, it 
might have decided the case on that basis, without having resort to the exten-
sion of the automatic disqualification rule to certain non-pecuniary inter-
ests.160  In R. v. Abdroikov, Baroness Hale noted with apparent approval the 
observation of Lord Hope in Meerabux.161  Once the test of apparent bias was 
a real possibility test, with no implicit limitation by reference to the need for a 
“real danger,” then apparent bias was more readily established, without the 
need for resort to automatic disqualification as in In re Pinochet (No. 2) on 
the basis of non-pecuniary interests.162  
More recently, Lord Justice Rix identified a “jurisprudential issue” as to 
whether the doctrine of automatic disqualification is “distinct from or allied 
to” apparent bias163 and considered whether there could be “perhaps . . . a 
reconciliation of the two.”164  Lord Justice Rix’s view was that automatic 
disqualification and apparent bias should be seen as, 
two strands of a single over-arching requirement: that judges 
should not sit or should face recusal or disqualification where there 
is a real possibility on the objective appearances of things, assessed 
by the fair-minded and informed observer  (a role which ulti-
mately, when these matters are challenged, is performed by the 
court), that the tribunal could be biased.165   
  
 159. See id. at 525-29.  It was contended that the chairman of the Belize Advisory 
Council (“BAC”) was disqualified from hearing “complaints of misbehaviour” 
brought against a judge on the ground that the chairman was a member of the Bar 
Association of Belize.  Id. at 519.  Membership of the Bar Association was a require-
ment for him to be an attorney-at-law and for him to serve as chairperson of the BAC.  
Id. at 524-25, 527.  He had had no involvement in the decision to prosecute the judge.  
Id. at 527.  His membership of the Bar Association did not make him a judge acting in 
his own cause and so automatically disqualified.  Id. at 527-28. If he had been ac-
tively involved in the prosecution, then he would have been automatically disquali-
fied.  Id. at 528. 
 160. Id. at 527. 
 161. [2007] 1 W.L.R. 2679 at 2697 (U.K.). 
 162. See id. 
 163. R. (on the application of Kaur) v. Inst. of Legal Execs. Appeal Tribunal, 
[2012] 1 All E.R. 1435  at 1441  (U.K.). 
 164. Id. (citing Lord Bingham in Davidson v. Scottish Ministers, [2004] UKHL 
34, (2005) 1 S.C. (H.L.) 7, ¶¶ 6-7 (U.K.)). 
 165. Id. at 1452.  In Kaur, the English Court of Appeal held that the vice-
president of [an institute for legal executives] was disqualified . . . from sitting on a 
disciplinary or appeal tribunal.”  Id. at 1452.  In the circumstances, she was automati-
cally disqualified.  See id.  Further, apparent bias was established because “[e]ven an 
employee of a prosecuting agency,” including one “not employed in a prosecutorial 
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It can be expected that when a suitable case presents, the Supreme Court 
of the United Kingdom will approve this dictum and take the jurisprudential 
issue a step further by jettisoning the automatic disqualification principle.166  
Absent actual bias, a pecuniary or non-pecuniary interest that would require 
automatic disqualification would in any event meet the test of apparent bias.  
This test asks whether there is a reasonable possibility that a fair-minded ob-
server would apprehend that the judge might not bring a fair and unprejudiced 
mind to determination of the issues before him or her. 
C.  Conclusions 
The alignment of the United Kingdom’s common law test for apparent 
bias with objective bias under the test for impartiality in Article 6(1) has been 
attributed by English judges to the aspiration, and later quasi-constitutional 
obligation, to conform to the European Convention.  However, in the same 
breath those judges have acknowledged that the bias rule in the United King-
dom was out of step with the bias rule in other common law countries.  In the 
United Kingdom the test had evolved in a way that lacked coherence, driven 
in large part by the extraordinary case of Pinochet (No. 2).  Neither the adop-
tion of the fair-minded observer test nor the abandonment of the real danger 
test was necessary in order to achieve conformity with the ECHR jurispru-
dence.  It was necessary in order to seek conformity with the test of reason-
able apprehension of bias in other common law countries. 
Pressure for consistency operated more obviously in the opposite direc-
tion.  The ECHR had accepted the maxim that justice must not only be done 
but must be seen to be done. The rationale for the maxim, of preserving pub-
lic confidence in the administration of justice, injected its own logic into the 
evolution of the test.  In conformity with that rationale, the methodology for 
the evaluation of appearances is being driven towards a test that engages a 
neutral member of the public rather than the judge or the judge’s detached 
colleagues.  The ECHR has yet to articulate fully the nature of the limitations 
upon the knowledge of the fair-minded observer.  Since a decision-maker 
with restricted knowledge is less able to meet a high standard of proof, as a 
matter of logic a lower threshold for establishing apparent bias should be 
adopted.  In the United Kingdom abandonment of the real danger test was a 
  
capacity,” would raise an apprehension in the fair-minded observer, “provided the 
employment is [not insignificant] . . . in [its] length or importance or location.”  Id. at 
1448-49.  Because the Supreme Court had not yet clearly brought the two tests to-
gether, Rix LJ applied them separately and concluded that the same conclusion was 
reached by application of each, namely disqualification.  Id. at 1452. 
 166. In Australia, which at all times confined automatic disqualification to pecu-
niary interests, the automatic disqualification rule was disapproved in 2000.  Ebner v. 
Official Tr. in Bankr. (2000) 205 CLR 337 at 356-57 (Austl.).  Henceforth, any case 
where a judge was alleged to have a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case was 
subject only to the apparent bias test.  See id. 
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natural accompaniment to adoption of the fair-minded observer.  However, in 
the United Kingdom the test of reasonable possibility has been retained, set-
ting a higher threshold than the test of reasonable apprehension which applies 
in other common law countries. Moreover the retention in the United King-
dom of the doctrine of necessity suggests a more serious impediment to 
achieving  consistency of the common law test of apparent bias with the test 
under Art 6(1).    
V.  BIAS RULE IN THE UNITED STATES 
A.  Constitutional Test 
In the United States a constitutional bias test has developed which does 
not depend upon concepts of independence and impartiality.  In Tumey v. 
Ohio, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was held to in-
corporate the common law principle that a judge must recuse when he or she 
has “a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest” in a case.167  The prin-
ciple was understood to reflect the maxim that “[n]o [person] is allowed to be 
a judge in his [or her] own cause,” but its compass was identified narrowly.168  
According to Tumey, the due process clause did not extend to bias on the 
ground of prejudgment, “personal bias,” or a broader principle of appre-
hended bias.169  This “constitutional floor”170 left other forms of bias, arising 
from friendship with a party or legal representatives, prior employment, ex-
trajudicial statements political or religious affiliation, to be regulated by the 
common law or statute.171  
Confined to the principle in Tumey, constitutional bias in the United 
States appeared to have been a counterpart to common law automatic dis-
qualification for pecuniary interest.  However, constitutional bias was later 
extended to include circumstances of pecuniary interest that were not direct 
or positive, but “would offer a possible temptation to the average . . . judge to 
. . . lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear, and true . . . .”172  The inclu-
sion in the test of “possible temptation” suggests an evaluation of possibilities 
by an observer.  However, the constitutional test has not involved 
  
 167. 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927). 
 168. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 876 (2009) (discussing 
Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523). 
 169. See id. at 876-77 (quoting Tumey, 273 U.S. at 523).  
 170. Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997).  
 171. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820 (1986); Caperton, 556 
U.S. at 877;  see also Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Disqualification in the Aftermath 
of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 60 SYRACUSE L. REV. 247, 247-48 (2010). 
 172. Ward v. Vill. of Monroeville, Ohio, 409 U.S. 57, 60 (1972) (quoting Tumey, 
273 U.S. at 532);  see also Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 825; Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 
564, 579 (1973). 
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“blind[ing]” of the court to evidence that is available to it but might not be 
part of the assumed knowledge of an external observer.173 
The test covered interests that were not purely pecuniary.  For instance, 
in Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Lavoie, Judge Embry, a judge of the 
Alabama Supreme Court, had an interest in the outcome of the case in that he 
was the lead plaintiff in a nearly identical proceeding pending in Alabama’s 
lower courts against an insurance company.174  There was a temptation for 
him to decide the case so as to increase the prospect of winning his lawsuit.175  
Therefore, the judge should have recused because he had a pecuniary interest, 
and had acted as a judge in his own case.176  The interest of Judge Embry in 
Lavoie has some analogies with the interest of Lord Hoffmann in In re Pino-
chet (No. 2).177  However, there is no suggestion that the Supreme Court 
treated the constitutional test as requiring automatic disqualification once the 
nature of the interest was identified. 178 
From the 1950s constitutional bias developed a second strand, which 
had no connection with pecuniary interest.  A judge’s participation in an ear-
lier proceeding in which he charged a person with perjury or contempt of 
court gave the judge a conflict of interest in determining such charges.179  
Supported by the maxim that no person is allowed to be a judge in his or her 
own cause, the concern was with prejudgment rather than pecuniary inter-
est.180 This second strand covered “various situations in which experience 
teaches that the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or deci-
sionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable”.181  The situations in-
cluded those where the judge had been the target of party’s personal abuse or 
criticism or a “running controversy”,182 and in some cases arrangements 
where the judge or tribunal  exercised combined investigative and adjudica-
tive functions.183 
This evolution of the constitutional bias test was summarized and re-
affirmed in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co.184  The pecuniary interest of 
Justice Benjamin, a judge of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, 
was extraordinary.185  The Supreme Court held by majority that Justice Ben-
  
 173. Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 822, 825. 
 174. Id. at 822. 
 175. Id. at 823-24. 
 176. Id. at 824. 
 177. See supra note 113 and accompanying text. 
 178. Lavoie, 475 U.S. at 825. 
 179. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 466 (1971); In re Murchison, 349 
U.S. 133, 137-38 (1955). 
 180. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136. 
 181. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). 
 182. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501-03 (1974). 
 183. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133.  Cf. Withrow, 421 U.S. at 47-55. 
 184. 556 U.S. 868 (2009). 
 185. See id. at 872-74. 
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jamin should have recused from hearing an appeal from a trial court decision 
awarding a verdict of $50 million against a company.186  After the verdict and 
before the appeal, the chairman of the company contributed $3 million to the 
election campaign of Justice Benjamin.187  While actual bias would have been 
a basis for disqualification, the constitutional test was held to be an objective 
one, not directed at whether the judge had actual bias or whether he was cor-
rect in his subjective assessment that his motives were impartial.188  The test 
was expressed to be whether “‘under a realistic appraisal of psychological 
tendencies and human weakness,’ the interest ‘poses such a risk of actual bias 
or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due 
process is to be adequately implemented.’”189  The test in Lavoie was also 
applied, namely whether the extraordinary temporally related campaign con-
tributions “would offer a possible temptation to the average . . . judge to . . . 
lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true . . . .”190   
The extension of constitutional bias to indirect pecuniary interests, inter-
ests in winning lawsuits, circumstances where the judge had made decisions 
in earlier proceedings, and certain kinds of associations, has been accompa-
nied by an insistence upon the test remaining an objective one.  While the 
restricted range of interests and associations recognized in constitutional bias 
still leaves it as no more than a floor for extreme cases, within its limited 
range it is similar to common law apparent bias. 
  
 186. Id. at 886. 
 187. Id. at 873.  This was “more than the total amount spent by all other . . . sup-
porters [of Justice Benjamin]” and exceeded by $1 million “the total amount spent by 
the campaign committees of both candidates combined.”  Id.  He was elected by a 
small margin.  Id.  Justice Benjamin denied a motion for recusal brought before the 
petition for appeal was filed.  Id. at 873-74.  By a three to two majority, the Supreme 
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court judgment, with Justice Benjamin in the ma-
jority.  Id. at 874.  In a rehearing, Caperton again sought recusal of Justice Benjamin, 
and of another majority judge, Justice Maynard, who had been photographed “vaca-
tioning with [the chairman on] the French Riviera while the case was pending.”  Id.  
Justice Maynard recused, but Justice Benjamin again denied Caperton’s motion for 
recusal.  Id. at 874-75.  The company sought recusal of Justice Starcher, who had 
dissented, on the ground of “his public criticism of [chairman’s] role” in the election 
of Justice Benjamin.  Id.  Justice Starcher recused.  Id.  On the rehearing, again the 
judgment was two to three in favor of reversing the verdict below, with Justice Ben-
jamin in the majority, joined by Justice Davis who was a member of the previous 
majority and Justice Fox who had been allocated by Justice Benjamin as member of 
the bench hearing the appeal.  Id. at 875. 
 188. Id. at 881. 
 189. Id. at 883-84 (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975)). 
 190. Id. at 869 (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 825 (1986)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
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B.  Statutory Tests 
Statutory provision for recusal by district judges has existed since 1792.  
Its current version was codified at 28 U.S.C. section 144.191  The American 
Bar Association (“ABA”) also requires that “[a] judge . . . shall avoid impro-
priety and the appearance of impropriety.”192  The ABA Model Code test of 
the appearance of impropriety, adopted in most states,193 is “whether the con-
duct would create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge violated 
this Code or engaged in other conduct that reflects adversely on the judge’s 
honesty, impartiality, temperament, or fitness to serve as a judge.”194  As an 
objective standard, it is akin to objective bias under Article 6(1) and common 
law apparent bias, rather than subjective bias under Article 6(1) and common 
law actual bias.  
As revised in 1974, the codified test in 28 U.S.C. section 455, applying 
to federal magistrates, judges, and Supreme Court Justices, includes reference 
to impartiality, in section 455(a),195 and to bias, in section 455(b)(1),196 but 
contains no reference to independence.197  Section 455(a) requires any justice, 
judge, or magistrate in the United States to “disqualify himself in any pro-
ceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”198  Sec-
tion 455(b) provides that a judge “shall also disqualify himself” in circum-
stances set out in the following sub-paragraphs (1) to (5).199  Sub-paragraph 
(1) in section 455(b) is similar to section 144, which only applies to district 
court judges, in requiring disqualification where the judge “has a personal 
bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evi-
dentiary facts concerning the proceeding[.]”200  
Other sub-paragraphs in section 455(b) describe specific factual scenar-
ios concerning associations and interests that require disqualification. These 
are associations as a former legal adviser, witness, or an association with a 
legal adviser;201 participation as “counsel, adviser or material witness” or 
expression of an opinion “concerning the . . . merits of the . . . case,” while 
serving in governmental employment.202 Certain financial interests are also 
listed, arising personally or as a fiduciary, or an interest of a spouse or child 
  
 191. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 544 (1994) (discussing the Act of May 
8, 1792, ch. 36, § 11, 1 Stat. 278). 
 192. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (2011). 
 193. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 888. 
 194. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 1.2 cmt. 5 (2011). 
 195. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006). 
 196. Id. § 455(b)(1). 
 197. See id. § 455. 
 198. Id. § 455(a). 
 199. Id. § 455(b). 
 200. Id. § 455(b)(1). 
 201. Id. § 455(b)(2). 
 202. Id. § 455(b)(3). 
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in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceedings, “or any 
other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the pro-
ceeding.”203 Family and business associations included are that the judge, 
judge’s spouse, “or a person within the third degree of relationship . . . or the 
spouse of such a person . . . [i]s a party [or an officer, director, or trustee of a 
party] to the proceeding . . . [i]s acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; [i]s 
known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by 
the outcome of the proceeding; [or] [i]s to the judge’s knowledge likely to be 
a material witness in the proceeding.”204  Only section 455(b)(1) refers to 
bias.205  
Initially, in Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., the Court ef-
fectively treated section 455(a) as a “catch all” provision operating generally 
and free from the limitations of the particular scenarios described in section 
455(b).206  Pursuant to section 455(a), bias was to be evaluated on an objec-
tive basis, since what was in issue was not the reality but the appearance of 
bias.207 
That approach changed in Liteky v. United States.208  In this case, the is-
sue was whether an “‘extrajudicial source’ doctrine,” developed in the con-
text of section 144, applied to section 455(a).209  A trial judge who had pre-
sided in an earlier trial of a defendant for protest actions and had displayed 
animosity towards him in the proceedings, proposed to hear a trial of that 
defendant for acts of vandalism on a military reservation.210  The Court 
unanimously held that there was no basis for recusal.211  However, the Court 
divided on the construction of sections 455(b)(1) and 455(a).212  
The majority opinion retained the extrajudicial source doctrine, explain-
ing its rationale as lying in the pejorative connotation of the words “bias” or 
“prejudice” in sections 144 and 455(b)(1).213  The words are pejorative be-
cause they indicate that the judge’s disposition “go[es] beyond what is normal 
and acceptable.”214  It is affected by matters that are extrajudicial in the sense 
that they are “undeserved, or . . . rest[] upon knowledge . . . the [judge] ought 
not to possess . . . or . . . [are] excessive,” and are not matters properly ac-
quired in the course of proceedings on the basis of the evidence, or learned in 
  
 203. Id. § 455(b)(4). 
 204. Id. § 455(b)(5). 
 205. Id. § 455(b)(1). 
 206. 486 U.S. 847, 859-61 (1988). 
 207. Id. at 865. 
 208. 510 U.S. 540 (1994). 
 209. Id. at 541, 548. 
 210. Id. at 542. 
 211. Id. at 550. 
 212. Id. at 557 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 213. Id. at 550 (majority opinion). 
 214. Id. at 552. 
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earlier proceedings involving the same defendant.215  However, the majority 
opinion accepted that an extrajudicial source in the sense explained is not 
necessary to establishing “personal bias or prejudice” within sections 144 or 
455(b)(1).216  It may suffice if the judge takes an extreme view of the evi-
dence adduced in the proceedings.217  
In Liteky, the majority opinion described section 455(a) as requiring 
evaluation “on an objective basis, so that what matters is not the reality of 
bias or prejudice but its appearance.”218  However, the majority extended the 
extrajudicial source doctrine to section 455(a), concluding that the ambit of 
section 455(a) was thereby limited.219  The doctrine applied because the word 
“partiality,” the opposite of “impartiality” appearing in the section, has a pe-
jorative connotation.220  The majority was concerned with ensuring that the 
limitation they had identified in section 455(b)(1) was also a limitation upon 
section 455(a).221  Where circumstances potentially fell within a sub-
paragraph in section 455(b) but did not meet its specific requirements, those 
circumstances could not meet the test in section 455(a).222  The majority ac-
cepted that section 455(a) gives an expanded protection in respect of bias, but 
held that where section 455(a) overlaps with the protection given by section 
455(b), the limitations of the relevant sub-paragraph in section 455(b) must 
apply.223  Ultimately, the majority opinion held that in order to make out bias 
under section 455(a) it is necessary to show that “fair judgment [is] impossi-
ble.”224 
In this construction of section 455(a), Liteky is inconsistent with Lilje-
berg, as the concurring opinion in Liteky correctly held.225  While the major-
ity began with an acceptance of section 455(a) as posing an objective test 
requiring assessment of the appearance of bias, the extrajudicial source doc-
trine was a vehicle for undermining the approach taken in Liljeberg.226  The 
extrajudicial source doctrine has no foundation in the language of section 144 
or section 455(b)(1), creates a false dichotomy between internal and external 
sources of bias, does no useful work, and deserves to be abandoned for the 
reasons set out in the compelling minority opinion delivered by Justice Ken-
nedy.227  While the language of section 455(a) offers a test of apparent bias, 
  
 215. Id. at 550. 
 216. Id. at 548, 551. 
 217. Id. at 551. 
 218. Id. at 548 (emphasis removed). 
 219. Id. at 553. 
 220. Id. at 552. 
 221. Id. at 552-53. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 552-53. 
 224. Id. at 555. 
 225. Id. at 566 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 226. Id. 
 227. See id. at 561-62. 
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the majority opinion in Liteky, by construing it as setting a threshold of im-
possibility of fair judgment, effectively reduces it to a test of actual bias.228    
Despite Liteky, the Supreme Court has subsequently applied section 
455(a) in its own terms, without reference to such a limitation.  Thus, in Mi-
crosoft v. United States, Chief Justice Rehnquist applied section 
455(b)(5)(iii), then section 455(a), as discrete possible bases for his recusal 
by reason of his son being a partner in a firm whose client was a party to pro-
ceedings before him.229  The specific terms of section 455(b)(5)(iii) were not 
satisfied.230  In separately applying section 455(a), Chief Justice Renquist 
accepted that Liteky was authority that the test is one of the appearance of 
bias or prejudice, that it is an “objective test,” applied “from the perspective 
of a reasonable observer who is informed of all the surrounding facts and 
circumstances.”231 The limitations to section 455(a), discerned in Liteky, were 
not applied in Microsoft.232  Chief Justice Renquist concluded that the reason-
able observer would not conclude that an appearance of impropriety ex-
isted.233  
An approach similar to that in Microsoft was taken in Cheney v. United 
States District Court for the D.C., where Justice Scalia had joined the Vice 
President of the United States on a hunting trip at a time when Justice Scalia 
was hearing a proceeding brought by the Sierra Club against the National 
Energy Policy Development Group and its individual members, one of whom 
was the Vice President.234  In refusing a motion for his recusal, Justice Scalia 
stated that the applicable test was that in 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), namely whether 
“by reason of the actions [complained of], [his] ‘impartiality might reasona-
bly be questioned.’”235  Justice Scalia did not apply the approach taken in 
Liteky.236  Referring to Liteky and Microsoft, Scalia held that the test was to 
be applied “from the perspective of a reasonable observer who is informed of 
all the surrounding facts and circumstances.”237  It was of central importance 
  
 228. Id. at 556. 
 229. 530 U.S. 1301, 1301-02 (2000). 
 230. Id. at 1302. While the son was a person within the third degree of relation-
ship, the son did not have an interest that could be “substantially affected” by the 
outcome of the proceedings within the meaning of that sub-paragraph.  Id.  “[N]either 
[the son] nor his firm [had] done . . . work on the matter [in the proceedings before 
Chief Justice Rehnquist].”  Id.  
 231. Id. 
 232. See id. 
 233. Id. 
 234. 541 U.S. 913, 914-15 (2004) (mem. opinion of Scalia, J.). 
 235. Id. at 916 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (2006)). 
 236. See id. at 926-28. 
 237. Id. at 924 (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 
(2000)).  Ultimately the test Justice Scalia actually applied was whether “someone 
who thought [Scalia] could decide this case impartially despite [his] friendship with 
the Vice President would reasonably believe that [Scalia] cannot decide it impartially 
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that the appeal did not put in issue the personal interests of the Vice Presi-
dent, but only his actions taken in his official capacity.238  Justice Scalia 
pointed to the well-known and constant practice of justices enjoying friend-
ship and social intercourse with members of Congress and officers of the 
Executive Branch.239  
In all cases where disqualification is determined other than in an appeal, 
a judge accused of bias hears and determines the recusal requests, regardless 
of the judge’s personal or professional interest in the outcome.  This familiar 
irony of possibly biased judges hearing their own bias cases is more piquant 
in Cheney.240  The judgment deploys evidence available only to the judge and 
a tone of protest and persuasion, as if seeking to dispel a claim of actual bias.  
Of course, in the absence of actual bias, the reasonable observer – unaware of 
the circumstances that are within the personal knowledge of the judge – may 
nonetheless persist in reasonably questioning the judge’s impartiality.   A 
proper application of a reasonable observer test was prevented by Justice 
Scalia’s assumption that the reasonable observer was aware of facts known 
only to the judge.241  Applying that assumption, the reasonable observer is 
testing actual bias not apparent bias and is effectively the judge – bearing no 
resemblance to the fair-minded observer at common law.  
C.  Conclusions 
Both the constitutional bias test and the statutory test of bias in the 
United States draw upon the common law maxim that a person should not be 
a judge in his or her own cause.  Their historical roots lie in the common law.  
Yet constitutional bias has a narrower ambit than objective bias under Article 
6(1) or common law apparent bias.  The range of interests and associations 
recognized to generate bias is limited.  The threshold is one of possibilities. 
The statutory test, having been described as objective, and having recovered 
from a wrong turning in Liteky, has much in common with the test of appar-
ent bias in the United Kingdom.  It may reflect a test of “reasonable appre-
hension” that applies in some common law countries, being a threshold lower 
than that of real possibility in the United Kingdom.  The standard in section 
445(a) of “might reasonably be questioned” conjures up the idea of the com-
mon law external observer.  However, in both United States tests the external 
observer is permitted, unlike the fair-minded observer in the United King-
  
because [Scalia] went hunting with that friend and accepted an invitation to fly there 
with him on a Government plane.”  Id. at 928-29 (emphasis removed). 
 238. Id. at 916. 
 239. Id. 
 240. See id. at 913. 
 241. See generally id. at 924 (quoting Microsoft, 530 U.S. at 1302 (Rehnquist, 
C.J., respecting recusal)) (“It is well established that the recusal inquiry must be 
‘made from the perspective of a reasonable observer who is informed of all the sur-
rounding facts and circumstances.’”). 
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dom, to be fully apprised of the evidence.  Like common law apparent bias, 
the statutory test is vulnerable to the doctrine of necessity.242  Save in the case 
of the Supreme Court, “[t]he ability to designate judges from one court to 
another” should remove any need to have to resort to the doctrine of necessity 
to insist that a judge with an appearance of bias not be disqualified.243 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
Globalization of legal principle has been described as a “diverse and 
messy process”244 – even more so when the principle in question is itself con-
tentious and regularly arises for application in the midst of political contro-
versy.  Nonetheless, the ECHR jurisprudence on Article 6(1) may provide a 
basis for the ECHR’s construction of the tests in Article 21(3) of the Euro-
pean Convention and its Rules of Court for disqualification of its own mem-
bers, providing a model approach to the tests of other international tribunals.  
The test of objective bias as a test of impartiality under Article 6(1), the 
common law test of apparent bias in United Kingdom domestic law and the 
statutory test of bias in the United States share significant ground. 
The jurisprudence of the ECHR on the test of impartiality under Article 
6(1) of the European Convention has been obstinately abstract, yet is claimed 
by English courts to have had a vertical effect.245  The common law maxims 
that supplied the rationale for subjective and objective bias in the test of im-
partiality under Article 6(1), ultimately take credit for powerfully influencing 
the direction in which the ECHR has hesitantly developed principle.  Resolu-
tion of uncertainties in the United Kingdom test of apparent bias may owe 
more to judicial reflection upon the logic of the test deployed in other coun-
tries that share its common law heritage than it does to the vertical effect of 
ECHR jurisprudence.  As to the bias tests in the United States, there is no 
claim to be influenced or to influence.  Having embraced at least one of the 
common law maxims, the United States statutory test of apparent bias now 
has features of the test of apparent bias in the United Kingdom, but focuses 
on a very different external observer.  The emergence of a global bias test is 
possible, but may occur by processes that are least anticipated.  
 
  
 242. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213-16 (1980). 
 243. Louis J. Virelli III, The Unconstitutionality of Supreme Court Recusal Stan-
dards, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 1181, 1189 (2011). 
 244. Anne-Marie Slaughter, 40th Anniversary Perspective: Judicial Globaliza-
tion, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103, 1104 (2000).  
 245. Koch, Jr., supra note 2 at 17. 
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